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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT ANDERSON, FRED H.
SHEPHERD, EARL M. BAKER,
RICHARD \V. TIPPETTS and
EARL J. KNUDSON,
Plaintiffs wnd Appellan,ts,

-vs.-

Case No.

8140
ADRIAN WRIGHT and W.
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, partners, doing business under the name and
style of WRIGHT- WIRTHLIN
REALTORS,

\\T.

Defendants and Respondents.

B.RIEF· ·OF APPELLANTS

PRELil\IINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this brief, plantiffs and appellants will
be referred to as plaintiffs, and defendants and respondents will be referred to as defendants. All italics are
ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal arises out of an action con11nenced by
four salesmen against a real estate broker for pay1nent.
of compensation for the sale of houses located in the
:J;forning Side Heights Subdivision.
The case \vas tried to a jury and on November 2f>,
1953 it returned a verdict as follows (R. 230) :
On behalf of Scott Anderson __________________________ $987.50
On behalf of Earl M. Baker ____________________ ·________ 225.00
On behalf of Earl J. Knudson ________________________ 718.75
On behalf of Fred R. Shepherd______________________ 831.25
Judgment was entered on the verdict. On the 15th day of
Dece1nber, 1953, the Honorable Ray \Tan Cott, Jr.,
granted a motion vacating and setting aside the judgment
and ordered that judgment he entered for defendants
against plaintiffs "no cause of action" (R. 237).
This appeal is prosecuted so that this Court can
determine from the record whether or not there was
evidence to support the verdict of the jury.
The complaint originally set forth a cause of action
based on a 55% of 5% of the sales price of the homes sold
by plaintiffs while employed by defendants. After the
first day of trial, it appeared from the evidence presented by plaintiffs that there had been a 1nodification
of the usual standard employment agreement between the
real estate salesmen and broker. It was plaintiffs' posi-
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3
tion that their assent to this 1nodified arrangement was
obtained by fraud and concealment and overreaching by
the defendants. However, the court ruled that he would
not permit plaintiffs to recover on the theory of fraudulent concealment and ruled, which rule became the law
of the case, that plaintiffs could only recover on the
basis of the 1nodifica tion even though the modification
\vas obtained through fraud and overreaching. This
ruling was 1nade known to the jury on the rnorning of
the second day of trial at approximately 11 :15 and is
contained in a state1nent made by the court (R. 109).
At the same time, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
could file an amended cornplaint to conform to the proof
which they were presenting and had presented. The
amended complaint was prepared and filed during the
trial and upon the arnended complaint the trial proceeded
(R. 5).
The amended con1plaint was based on the theory
that plaintiffs had agreed to sell the hon1es in the Morning Side Heights Subdivision at $100.00 per house.
Wright-Wirthlin had failed, neglected and refused to
pay the $100.00 per house but had paid only a portion of
the $100.00 per house.
The evidence shows that all of the plaintiffs were
salesmen for the defendant brokerage; that in the early
part of May, 1950, the brokerage negotiated an agreement
with Felt Syndicate, Inc., which document is entitled
Sales Agency Agreement and is Exhibit 4. The agree-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

ment is dated the 11th day of ~Iay, 1950. The ter1ns of
this agreement were not made know·n to the plaintiffs.
Defendants did not divulge to plaintiffs the a1nounts
the brokerage was receiving as comrnission. Throughout
the sales campaign, defendants did not reveal to or in
any way make known to plaintiffs the contents of the
Sales Agency Agreement. Even at the ti1ne of trial,
defendants did everything in their pow~r to prevent the
contents of the Sales Agency Agree1nent, Exhibit 4, fro1n
being revealed to the court and jury. It will be noted
that in the examination of defendant Wirthlin, counsel
for defendants refused to put into evidence a copy of
the Sales Agency Agree1nent even though counsel for
plaintiffs repeatedly objected to examination concerning
the contents of the written instrument (R. 146, 147, 148).
Plaintiffs were only able to get into evidence the Sales
Agency Agreement after the direct examination of 1\tfr.
Wirthlin was finished (R. 164). This refusal by defendants to reveal to plaintiffs the exact working arrangement with F'elt Syndicate, Inc., was one of the bases for
plaintiffs' original claim that there had been a fraudulent concealment and overreaching. However, it being
the law of the case that plaintiffs could not recover more
than $100.00 per house, the plaintiffs proceeded on the
theory imposed upon them by the court's ruling.
It 'vas undisputed by all of the parties that Wright'Virthlin agreed to pay each of the plaintiffs $100.00
per house which plaintiffs sold. It 'vas further undisputed that a large number of houses 'vere sold. Exhibit
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No. 3, prepared by defendants, sho,vs the exact number
accredited to each of the plaintiffs.

~[r.

vVirthlin and

all of the sales1nen testified that not one of the sales
accomplished by the plaintiffs back-fired (R·. 177). Every
buyer perfor1ned under the agreement "\vhich the plaintiffs obtained. The purchasers "\Vere required to sign
Earnest :nioney Receipts and Agreements, a copy of the
form used is Exhibit 1. The Sales Agency Agreement
provided as follows:
"3. A sale is to be considered made and the
comn1ission earned when a purchaser has been
obtained 'vho has signed a contract for th·e purchase of the lot and home to be built upon the lot,
and such purchaser's application for a loan to
either the Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association or the Prudential Insurance Company
has been approved, and the mortgage recorded.
In the event a purchaser fails and refuses to go
forward and forfeits the earnest money payment,
such sum so forfeited will be applied first to payment of loan costs, and the remainder shall be
divided equally between the First Party and
Second Party, and in such event no additional
commission shall be charged."
Exhibit 1, the Earnest 1foney Receipt and Agreement, contains a provision that the loaning institution,
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, would
pay out the down payment made by the purchaser and
the proceeds of the loan at certain percentages as the
housing construction progressed.
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The Sales Agency Agreen1ent, Exhibit 4, provided
for payment to Wright-Wirthlin of the $300.00 couunission. The brokerage was to receive this couunission at
certain stages of construction. Paragraph 2 of said agreement contains the following language: "This sales conlmission is to he paid on the same percentage dra-\v basis
as other items are paid through the disbursal during the
progress of the construction progran1."
The houses which were sold by plantiffs were constructed. During the construction, the contractor beca1ne
unable to proceed with the construction project. Felt
Syndicate, Inc. likewise failed. When Felt failed, it
transferred and assigned to Wright-"\Virthlin twelve
options to purchase lots and received for the transfer a
credit of $150.00 per lot on the amounts due and owing
from Felt to Wright-Wirthlin. This transfer of lots in
partial satisfaction of the Wright-Wirthlin claim was
done without the knowledge of or the consent of plaintiffs. F'elt also assigned to the defendants all of the
funds which they had coming from Prudential Federal
under the contracts covering the construction of Morning
Side Heights (R. 192, 194). This assignment placed in
the hands of the broker all of the rights of Felt to funds
payable under its contract. Defendants received in cash
and credit on the options for the twelve lots a total of
$14,590.74 (Exhibit 2). They paid out of said sum to all
salesmen, including plaintiffs, approximately $5400.00,
or approximately 54% of the amount which the salesmen
earned. In the amount thus credited, Wrigh't-Wirthlin
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refused to g1ve credit for the profits which they made
from the options received from Felt. Nor, have defendants taken into account the value of the lawsuit which
they have against the bonds on the construction job and
the assign1nent "vhich they received fron1 Felt for its
share of the miscellaneous fund account.
Defendants informed the sales1nen, including these
plaintiffs, that payments of their commission would be
at the same rate as the construction draws were made as
the house construction project progressed. The salesmen
testified that they looked to defendants for the payment
of their $100.00 (R. 66, 69, 113 and 115). At no time were
the plaintiffs informed of the negotiations between
Wright-Wirthlin and Felt nor were the salesmen offered
any part of the consideration which was in the form of
lots and assign1nent of funds. No accounting was ever
given to the salesmen during the time that they worked
for defendants. Not until after this suit was filed against
defendants for their compensation was any accounting
made.
It was freely admitted that defendants did not keep
track of the various stages of construction of the houses
sold by the individual salesmen. Nor did Wright-Wirthlin
attempt to pay to each salesman his share of the draws
which were made on the houses which he sold (R·. 213 to

215).

Plaintiffs repeatedly demanded payment from

defendants and were always given the story that the
monies had not been collected.
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The houses 'vere all occupied by the buyers. ':rhe
n1oney for the construction of the ho1nes 'vere paid in
full by Prudential Federal. These funds, as was indicated by the Sales Agency Agreement, were to be paid
out at the various stages of construction. The funds were
paid out to the last dollar (R. 169, 170). However, G.I.
approval was not obtained on the homes and as a consequence the Prudential Federal Inortgages have not
been given a Veterans' Adn1inistration guarantee (R.
167). The failure of the V.A. to guarantee the mortgages
"\vas based upon its refusal to approve the ho1nes (R. 172).
At the close of all the evidence, the court instructed
the jury orally (R. 223). Neither plaintiffs nor defendants are here complaining about the instructions. The
instructions fairly and fully submitted the factual propositions covered by the evidence 'vhich the jury was
required to pass upon.
Instruction No. 4 sets forth the crucial proposition
upon which the jury was required to pass. It reads as
follows, (R. 225) :
"Instruction No. 4. Before you can find these
defendants are liable you 1nust find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract entered into by them with these plaintiffs
whereby they rendered themselves personally
liable as defendants to the plaintiffs for the payInent of these commissions."
Upon the quoted instruction the jury necessarily found
in' favor of the plaintiffs. The evidence fully justified
such a finding.
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S1.,_.\ TEniENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE EVIDEN.CE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE $100.00 PER HOUSE COMMISSION.

_A_RGUl\!ENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDEN.CE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE $100.00 PER HOUSE COMMISSION.

rllhere \vas no dispute jn the evidence concerning the
I

basic facts and dealings between plaintiffs and defendants. The exhibits and the testin1ony did not conflict in
very rnany particulars. Where there \Vere conflicts, they
\\'"ere of a minor nature.
The fundarnental problern presented by the evidence
w-as one of interpretation. The interpretation and significance of conduct on the part of plaintiffs and defendants
and the rneaning of the \Vritten instrurnents vvere pre~ented

for the jury's consideration. Plaintiffs subn1it

that such interpretation is the perrogative of the jury
and is a part of the function

\\~hich

the Constitution of

the State of l ~tah requires that they be perrnitted to
perforrn.
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There is no dispute between plaintiff~ and defendants concerning the fact that the proposition \Ya~ ~nh
nlitted to the jury by the court's instruction. A re-exainination of those instructions by this court \Yill indicatP~
plaintiffs feel sure, that the proposition was fairly, concisely and clearly subn1itted to the jury by th·e court'~
instructions.
The verdict was in plaintiffs' behalf. The ruling by
the trial court which entirely disregarded and set asidr
the jury's verdict could only be justified if there \Vas no
evidenee which supported the verdict found by the jury.
This rule of la\v is so clear and undisputed that no 111ore
than a few cases \vill be cited to support it.
Until the ne\v rules of civil procedure were adopted,
under Utah law, a trial court could not entertain a n1otion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Buhler r.
Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933; Kirk t·. Salt Lake
City, 32 lTtah 143, 89 P. 458, 12 A.L.R., N.S. 1021. Rule
50 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for consideration of a 1notion to set aside the judgment entered
on a verdict. In Morby v. Rogers, ______ Utah ______ (1953)~
252 P. 2d 231, p. 232, this Court stated the rule for 1Ttah
as follows:
"It is well settled that in order for a court
to grant a request for a directed verdict or for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict grounded
on non-negligence of defendant, the record must
disclose no evidence against the party so requesting upon which reasonable minds could find him
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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guilty of the negligence charged. The issue here,
then, was whether the record disclosed any evidence upon which the jury could have found the
appellant guilty of negligence."
The Federal cases have interpreted Rule 50 (b) and
the guide set up there would apply in Utah. In Binder
c. Conunercial Travelers Mut. ~Jcc . .._4ss'n., 165 F. 2d 896,
p. 901, the Necond Circuit Court ;stated the rule as follo\vs:
~·In

setting aside the verdict as against the
~weight' of the evidence, \Ve think the district
judge resorted to a for1nula \vhich is no longer
(if it ever was) appropriate. The discussions in
the opinions in Galloway v. lTnited States, 319
U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458, show that
it is the jury's, not the court's, function to weigh
the evidence, and it is only \vhere there is lacking
any evidence of substance upon which reasonable
1nen could reach the result represented by the
verdict that a judge 1nay interfere."
.A. n1ore co1nplete staten1ent of the rule with authori-

ties is found in Frabutt r. }l cu: 1·· ork, C. & St. L. R. Co.,
88 F. Supp. 821, p. 825, \vhere J'udge ( iourley says:
'"In passing upon a n1otion to set aside a
verdict for plaintiff and to enter judgrnent for the
defendant, evidence including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all
conflicts must be resolved in his favor. \VaggaInan v. General Finance Co. of Philadelphia, Pa.,
Inc., 3 Cir., 116 F.2d 25-l:; Schad et al v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Fihn Corp. et al., 3 Cir., 136 F.2d

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
991; Lukon v. Pennsylvania R.. Co., :~ Cir., 1:n
F.2d 327; ~Ieyonberg v. Pennsylvania R. Co., ;~
Cir., 165 F.2d 50; Kraus v. Reading Co., 3 Cir.,
167 F.2d 313; O'Brien v. Public Service rraxi ( ~o.,
3 Cir ., 178 F .2d 211.
The court cannot concern itself with th~
credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence. Roth ·r·. Swanson, 8 Cir., 145 F.2d 262.
The court is not free to reweigh the evidence
and set aside the jury's verdict merely because
the jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions, or because the court regards another
result as n1ore reasonable. Tennant v. Peoria &
P. U. Ry. Co., 321 lT.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 I.J.Ed.
520.
Where uncertainty as to the existence of
negligence arises from a conflict in the testimony,
or because, the facts being undisputed, fairminded men will honestly draw different conclusions from the1n, the question is not one of la\\T
but of fact to be settled by the jury. Gunning v.
Cooley, 281 lT.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed.
720."
The Sales Agency Agreement, Exhibit 4, required
the payment of $300.00 commission. Defendants were
entitled to be paid the commission as the houses \vere
constructed. It contains unequivicallangua.ge as follow·s:

"* * * this sales commission is to be paid on the same
percentage draw basis as other i terns are paid through
the dis bursal during the progress of construction program." It is undisputed that the percentages were paid
in their entirety and that all of the funds provided for
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the construction of the :.Jiorning Side lieights' homes
haYe been disbursed. Defendants are entitled to their
$300.00 per house conunission since all of the funds available for the construction of the houses have been paid
and that is the condition upon \vhich the sales corninission i8 to be paid. Plaintiffs therefore submit that they
are entitled to their $100.00 per house from defendants.
The evidence in its light n1ost favorable to the plaintiffs requires that regardless of any agreernents defendants rnay have had with F'elt, they \vere entitled to their

$100.00 per house as an absolute proposition.
The basic and funda1nental proposition which defendants are atte1npting to have this Court sustain is
that plaintiffs rnust be required to assume the risk that
the defendants do not

collf~ct

the funds due them under

the Sales Agency Agree1nent. Plaintiffs submit, to require them to do so \vould be grossly inequitable, unfair
and not in accordance with plaintiffs' understanding nor
even as conte1nplated by defendants.
To illustrate the unfairness of defendants' proposition, consider the follo\ving \vhich are shown by the
evidence:
1. None of the plaintiffs were parties to the
Sales Agency Agreement.
None of the plaintiffs knew of the terms of
the Sales Agency Agreement.

·J
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3. None of the plaintiff~ kne\\~ of thP alllount of
commissions w·hich defendants \vere rereivinp; and
had, therefore, no basis for passing on the fairness of the contract.
4. Plaintiffs were not infor1ned of the parties to
the Sales Agency Agreement nor to \vhon1 defendants were looking for the pa~~ment of the connni~
sions \Yhich were earned.
5. All of the negotiations, collections and procedures by defendants were taken \vithout consultation between defendants and plaintiffs.
6. Defendants reeeived and aeeepted property
and agreed to delay the payments under the ~ales
Agency Agreement terms without eonsulting \rith
plaintiffs.
7. Defendants own and \vill have all the benefit~
of any causes of aetion or claiins which it is successful in pursuing against Felt Syndieate, Prudential Federal or the bonds of Cassidy, the construction contractor.
8. Defendants will be per1nitted to retain avproximately $9,190.74 out of the $14,590.74 \vhich
they have eollected, plus all of tlie profits which
they have received from the sale of the twelve lots,
options to which they received from Felt 8yndicate and thus profit tremendously without paying
to the plain tiffs the amount which all agreed
would be paid as consideration for the selling of
the Morning Side Heights' homes.
The proposition which defendants are attempting to
foist on to the Court, and have to the present time successfully foisted off on Judge \::an Cott, would require
that employees assu1ne the risk that their employer col-
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lect all of his accounts receivable before they are entitled
to be paid their salaries. Such a proposition is unknown
in the annals of busines~ relations, it is a risk the
en1ployer assu1nes and is paid for in the an1ount of his
gross profit on sales.
There is no dispute that plaintiffs rendered the
services required of then1 and that binding and subsisting sales contracts were entered into. Every duty required of the sales1nen \vas perfor1ned in full. The only
thing \vhich was left undone in the co1nplete performance
\\~as the collection fron1 Felt Syndicate of the agreed and
earned sales co1nmission.
Who should be saddled ,,~i th the loss suffered by
reason of the failure to collect from Felt Syndicatethe salesmen ,,,.ho had no contract with that group, or
the broker \vho negotiated the contract and dealt with,
negotiated \vith, and co1npro1nised with the Syndicate 1
The ans\ver seems to be clear and unequivical and plaintiffs submit that no judgment other than a reversal of
Judge \;--an Cott's granting of judg1nent notwithstanding
the verdict can achieve a fair and equitable result in this

case.
The rules of interpretation and construction of contracts has been repeatedly set forth in our Utah cases.
It has al\vays been our la\v that if there is ambiguous
language or language which is susceptible of more than
one 1neaning, the 1neaning adopted is the one most favor-
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able to the person not using the language. 'rhe rirrnlnstances and positions of the parties and the subject
matter and all other surrounding facts are to be considered in finding th·e true intention of the parties. 'J1hi~
job of finding the language of the contract and thrn
interpreting it is to be left to the jury. Penn Star Miniu.r1
Co. v. Ly1n.an, 64 Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jordan r. llladseu,
et a.Z, 69 Utah 112, :2:52 P. 570; Fo.r FilJn Corporation r.
Ogden Th,ea.tre Co._. 832 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294; Miffliu
v. Shiki, 77 lTtah 190, 293 P. 1. The n1ost recent reiteration of the rules for interpretation and construction i~
Read) v. Forced Un,derfiring Corp., 82 lJtah 529, 26 1>. 2d
325, p. 327. There this Court stated as follows:
"In construing the terrn 'net profits' as used
in the contract, it is the duty of the court to consider the language in connection with the conditions and circumstances under which the partie~
were contracting and the relation which they sustained to each other. _2 Elliott on Contracts, 77 -+.
Where the language is mixed and susceptible
of more than one construction, the court should
attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the
situation of the parties to the contract at the time
the agreernent was entered into, so that it 1nay
view the circumstances as viewed by the parties
themselves to be enabled to understand the language used in the sense with which the parties
used it. In order to accomplish this purpose it i;-;
generally proper for the court to take notice of
the surroundings and attendant circumstances and
consider the language used in the light of such
circumstances. Id., p. 791.

*

*

*
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1t i~ a fa1niliar rule of construction that the
language used 1nust be construed most strongly
against the person using it. In this case, the contract i8 in the forn1 of a letter written by the
defendant corporation to the plaintiff in which
they set out the terms of the e1nployment. It is
their language used at a tin1e when no salaries
vvere being paid and were apparently not in contemplation of being paid. _.._\t that time, under
the conditions surrounding the plaintiff, he could
not be expected to anticipate the creation of the
new expenses which, if allowed, -vvould 1nake meaningless that part of the contract referring to net
proceeds. The contract should be so construed as
to require the payn1ent of co1n1nissions due the
plaintiff upon the net proceeds of the Salt Lake
division without deducting salaries voted to the
directors as managers after the contract had been
entered into."
~.,ro1n

the authorities eited, it \Yould appear that the
function of the jury vvhere the existence of an agreement
is denied is to first find vvhether or not there \Yas an
agreement and second, it n1ust find the 1neaning of the
agree1nent. The jury in this case under instructions
~atisfactory to both partie~, found that there was an
agree1nent, and further found that under that agreement
there were certain sun1s due plaintiffs. The trial court
in entering judg1nent against plaintiffs ignored this vei--dict and usurped the function vvhich the Constitution
requires he permit the jury to perform.
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court's ruling should
he set aside and the verdict of the jury should be ordered
reinstated.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court has usurped
the function of the jury and has unconstitutionally denied
them the right to a jury trial and the result thereof.
This Court should order the restoration of the judg1nent
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
DWIGHT L. KING
Counsel for Appellants

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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